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a b s t r a c t 
We study the information aggregation process in a laboratory financial market where traders have access 
to costly private and free public imperfect information. The public disclosure provokes (i) a crowding- 
out effect on traders’ information demand, (ii) a market overreaction to the public signal, and (iii) a 
deterioration in price informativeness. We show that the reduction in price informativeness is a direct 
consequence of the overweighting of public information when aggregated in prices. Moreover, we pro- 
vide experimental evidence for the theoretical conjecture that the overweighting effect and the subse- 
quent market overreaction to public disclosures are directly related to traders’ second- (or higher) order 
beliefs. From an economic policy perspective, we provide support that when deciding on a communica- 
tion strategy, regulatory institutions can smooth the market overreaction by properly setting the level of 
transparency of their disclosures. 
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 












































The idea that a price system based on competitive markets can 
ggregate information dispersed in the economy dates back to the 
940s ( Hayek, 1945 ). Economists have understood that in properly 
esigned asset markets, prices can aggregate and disseminate the 
nformation possessed by traders, although this is not necessar- 
ly done efficiently. Instead of leaving the market operating alone, 
ublic disclosures might facilitate the information aggregation and 
issemination process. We ask whether and how the presence of a 
egulatory institution that releases public information can be ben- 
ficial for market performance. If it is assumed that public infor- 
ation simply accumulates with the information already present 
n the market, it seems quite natural that more information should 
e valuable for decision makers. 
However, the theoretical literature has shown that, when there 
xist strategic interactions among decision makers, public disclo- 
ures may lead to unintended consequences: (i) Public disclosures 
ight reduce the production of private information (the crowding- 
ut effect ). (ii) Public disclosures might be weighted above and be- 
ond their precision (the overweighting effect ), contrary to the pre- ∗ Corresponding author at Economics Department, University Jaume I, Avenida 
os Baynat s/n 12071, Castellón, Spain 





378-4266/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article ucription of the Bayesian rule, which states that each signal should 
e weighted proportionally to its precision. What would be an in- 
uitive reason for the emergence of the overweighting effect? Let 
s assume that a financial trader has access to public and private 
nformation, both providing an equally valuable prediction for the 
sset’s return. Differently from private information, public informa- 
ion is common knowledge among traders ( Aumann, 1976 ); that is, 
ll traders know it, and all traders know that the others know it, 
tc. Let us further assume that this trader gives some importance 
o the average opinion of the other traders in deciding her invest- 
ent strategy. She knows that everyone observes the same pub- 
ic information, which becomes a relevant predictor of the average 
pinion. Therefore, she will put more weight on public informa- 
ion than on private information. If a significant fraction of traders 
ollows this behavior, public information turns out to be a focal 
oint for the coordination of traders’ expectations, exerting an ex- 
essive influence on market prices. The crucial aspect for the emer- 
ence of the overweighting effect lies in the direct influence that 
ublic information exerts on what traders believe about the other 
raders’ beliefs. The purpose of this article is to experimentally an- 
lyze how public information affects traders’ beliefs, and thereby 
o explore the extent of the overweighting phenomenon. Can we 
dentify the overweighting effect? Is it empirically relevant? Can 
e smooth the undesirable consequences of public disclosures? nder the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 











































































































An extended line of research explores the primitives to ob- 
erve the detrimental effects of public disclosures and their con- 
equences in coordination games based on the influential Keynes’ 
eauty contest metaphor of financial markets. Note that the pres- 
nce of an explicit incentive for traders to coordinate reinforces the 
ffectiveness of public information in aligning expectations, facili- 
ating the emergence of the overweighting effect. In Morris and 
hin ’s (2002) ) seminal paper, 1 they show that public information 
an be considered a double-edged instrument, conveying informa- 
ion about the fundamentals (the informational component) and 
t the same time, providing information about what the other 
raders believe about the fundamentals (the commonality compo- 
ent). The authors conjecture that financial markets overreact to 
ublic disclosures, because public information is extremely effec- 
ive ( too effective using the words of Morris and Shin (2002) ) in co-
rdinating traders’ beliefs. Therefore, even a “small noise” in pub- 
ic information can be amplified at the aggregate level, driving the 
conomic system far from fundamentals and possibly damaging so- 
ial welfare. 2 
Other papers analyze the consequences of public disclosures 
n a market environment, without introducing an explicit coordi- 
ation motive. 3 Allen et al. (2006) are the first to directly con- 
ect the overweighting of public information with traders’ exces- 
ive reliance on public disclosures. They illustrate how the role of 
econd-order beliefs, i.e., beliefs that a trader forms about other 
raders’ beliefs, generates the overweighting effect. Specifically, 
llen et al. (2006) show that asset prices overweight public infor- 
ation relative to private information when traders’ willingness to 
ay is related to their beliefs about others’ average opinion on the 
uture evolution of the asset price. 
Despite the extensive theoretical literature on market overreac- 
ion to public disclosures, there is no empirical evidence support- 
ng its relevance beyond an anecdotal narrative (see Blinder et al., 
008 ). Thus, the laboratory provides a suitable platform to investi- 
ate the unintended consequences of public disclosures in markets 
n general and in financial markets in particular. It is possible to 
ontrol and to observe all information in the hands of subjects, to- 
ether with their trading activity. 
This paper contributes to the literature by experimentally test- 
ng whether the adverse effects of public disclosures are gen- 
ral phenomena to be observed in a market context beyond the 
oordination environment. We investigate the impact of releas- 
ng an imperfect, public, and costless signal into an asset market 
here traders have access to imperfect and costly private infor- 
ation about the future prospect of the asset. This setting allows 
s to examine under which conditions the presence of public in- 
ormation may act as a sort of disciplining mechanism, promot- 
ng the aggregation of information or in contrast, systematically 
istorting the market performance, driving the price far from the 
undamentals. 
We analyze under which conditions the overweighting of 
ublic information reduces price informativeness and consti- 
utes the source of the market overreaction to public dis- 1 Several generalizations of the original framework have been proposed 
y Angeletos and Pavan (20 04, 20 07) , Myatt and Wallace (2011) , and 
olombo et al. (2014) . 
2 See the classical papers by Hirshleifer (1971) and Hakansson et al. (1982) . 
ee also more recent papers such as Colombo et al. (2014) , Vives (2014) , and 
oldstein and Yang (2017) , among others. 
3 See also Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2008) , Amador and Weill (2010) , and 
oldstein and Yang (2019) . Another strand of literature (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia, 
991; Barron and Karpoff, 2004 ) explores the relation among public announcement 













2 losures. Several authors, such as Ackert et al. (1997, 2004) , 
iddeldorp and Rosenkranz (2011) , Ferri and Morone (2014) , and 
alim et al. (2019) , investigate the impact of a public signal 
n a laboratory financial market. When public information is re- 
eased, they consistently report a reduction in price informative- 
ess, which they attribute to the lower acquisition of information. 
n contrast, our results suggest that the overweighting effect is the 
ain determinant of the deterioration in price informativeness. To 
he best of our knowledge, our paper is the first experimental con- 
ribution to detect and quantify the overweighting effect in a mar- 
et context that, contrary to coordination settings, does not pro- 
ide traders with any explicit coordination motive to align their 
xpectations. 
Unlike the theoretical literature on the overweighting of public 
nformation, we show that traders’ bounded rationality is responsi- 
le for the emergence of this phenomenon in our experiment. Full 
ationality in our setting implies either an absence of trading activ- 
ty or a market price that weights each signal, private and public, 
ccording to its precision. In both cases, public information is never 
verweighted compared to its precision. Thus, the observation of a 
ystematic deviation toward the public signal challenges the cur- 
ent rational view of the overweighting effect as in the Morris and 
hin (2002) framework, posing new theoretical and experimen- 
al questions on how to release public information. Moreover, we 
rovide experimental support for Allen et al. ’s (2006) ) conjecture 
bout the role of second-order beliefs as the main driver of the 
mergence of the overweighting phenomenon. Finally, we observe 
hat lowering the precision of public disclosures, interpreted as the 
evel of transparency, reduces the overweighting effect. Our finding 
upports the idea that releasing public information can be harmful 
or the performance of a financial market if the information is not 
roperly tailored to the market conditions. 
Instead of being limited to an academic debate, the excessive 
mpact of public information has become a cause of concern for 
egulatory institutions. The 2008 financial crisis is a good exam- 
le of excessive impact if one takes into account the influence 
hat credit rating agencies’ valuations had on investors’ financial 
ecisions, who blindly followed what turned out to be mislead- 
ng advice ( European Commission, 2010; Scalet and Kelly, 2012; 
mtenbrink and Heine, 2013; Cavallaro and Trotta, 2019; Hu et al., 
019 ). Besides the excessive reliance on ratings, the agencies’ pres- 
nce might have given to investors fewer incentives to search for 
ndependent and alternative sources of information for evaluat- 
ng innovative financial products. To avoid such adverse effects, 
egulatory institutions proposed new measures to improve mar- 
et participants’ internal risk management capabilities and reduce 
he excess reliance on external credit ratings ( European Commis- 
ion, 2009 ). In the same line, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
nd the Consumer Protection Act of 2010 were approved by the 
.S. Congress ( Chaffee, 2010 ). The adverse effects of releasing pub- 
ic information are also relevant for regulatory institutions such as 
entral banks when setting the level of transparency in their for- 
ard guidance activity or communicating stress-tests results for 
he banking system. In recent years, central banks have included in 
heir research agenda the study of how public communications and 
isclosure policies affect agents’ behavior and incentives ( Bank of 
ngland, 2015 ). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 , we
escribe the experimental design, and in Section 3 , we discuss the 
ompeting benchmarks employed to account for the asset market 
utcomes. In Section 4 , we present the experimental findings. In 
ection 5 , we discuss the behavioral insights of our experimental 
ndings. Finally, in Section 6 , we present concluding remarks, with 
articular emphasis on policy implications for regulatory institu- 
ions. 
A. Ruiz-Buforn, E. Camacho-Cuena, A. Morone et al. Journal of Banking and Finance 133 (2021) 106298 
Table 1 
Experimental design and parameters. The parameter p denotes the precision of 
private signals, and P stands for the precision of the common or public signal. 
Treatment p P Number of markets 
Baseline B 0.8 - 20 
Public 
information 
PS80 0.8 0.8 20 
PS70 0.8 0.7 20 





































































































. Experimental design and procedure 
.1. Experimental design 
Our experimental setting is similar to other contributions in the 
iterature on laboratory financial markets with Arrow-Debreu as- 
ets. 4 Each market (labeled with “m ”) consists of a three-minute 
rading period, and it is populated by 15 traders. 5 At the be- 
inning of the trading period, each trader is endowed with C 0 = 
 , 0 0 0 units of experimental currency (ECU) and A 0 = 10 Arrow-
ebreu assets. Each asset pays a dividend D m ∈ { 0 , 10 } at the end
f the market with 50 − −50 chances, which is common knowl- 
dge among traders. Assets live only for a single trading period, 
hat is, one market, and they are worthless apart from the divi- 
end paid out. 6 The value of the dividend is randomly determined 
y the experimenter before the market starts, but it is not revealed 
o the traders until the end of the market, when the traders’ pay- 
ff is determined. The asset market is implemented as a double 
uction, where traders are free to introduce their bids and asks for 
ssets or directly accept any other trader’s outstanding bid or ask. 
very bid, ask, or transaction concerns only one asset, although 
ach trader can handle as many assets as desired as long as she 
as enough cash or assets (no short sales are allowed). 
Parallel to the asset market, we implement an information mar- 
et where, at any moment during the trading period, traders can 
cquire imperfect private signals at a price of 4 ECU per signal. 
rivate signals are independent realizations conditional on the div- 
dend value, and they are presented to traders with a value of 10 
r 0. Specifically, we define as p the probability of getting a signal 
uggesting a dividend 10 when the state of the world is D m = 10 ,
nd with q = 1 − p the probability of getting a signal suggesting a 
ividend 0. Mutatis mutandis for the state of the world D m = 0 . We
efer to p as the precision of the signal. As the objective of our pa-
er is to examine whether disclosing a public signal distorts mar- 
et prices, we give the market the opportunity to correct possible 
istortions. To do so, we allow traders to acquire private informa- 
ion conditional on the observed dynamics of prices, implementing 
n information market parallel to the asset market. This particular 
etting should provide the market the best chances to prevent the 
istortive effects of public information. We are implicitly assuming 
hat the market can recognize the distortion and eventually, cor- 
ect it with a flow of new private information. 
Table 1 summarizes the implemented treatments. In the base- 
ine treatment (B), traders have access only to costly private infor- 
ation. To investigate the impact of public information on mar- 
et performance, we introduce the public information treatments 
PS80 and PS70). In these treatments, traders can acquire private 
ignals and have free access to a public signal , which is released 4 See, for example, Ackert et al. (1997, 2004) , Hey and Morone (2004) , 
eck et al. (2013) , Fellner and Theissen (2014) , Ferri and Morone (2014) , 
sparouhova et al. (2017) , Page and Siemroth (2017, 2020) , and Halim et al. (2019) . 
5 In the baseline treatment, group 1 is populated by 13 traders. 
6 The cash, dividends, prices, and profits during the experiment are designated 







3 t the beginning of each market. This signal is identical for all 
raders and is common knowledge. The realization of the public 
ignal might take a value of 10 or 0 with precision P . We do not
rovide the institution releasing the public signal with a pay-off
r target function. The public signal is the realization of a binary 
andom variable with a given correlation with the fundamentals, 
nd it does not emerge out of a micro-funded strategy of the reg- 
latory authority releasing the signal. Comparing treatments PS80 
nd PS70 allows to test whether by acting at the level of preci- 
ion of the released information, we might enhance or mitigate the 
rowding-out effect and the market overreaction to public disclo- 
ures. 
To disentangle the two components that render public informa- 
ion a double-edged instrument, we implement the common infor- 
ation treatment (CS80) in which traders receive a costless signal 
hose realization is identical for all of them, but it is not com- 
on knowledge. In other words, they know only that each trader 
eceives one signal with the same precision, but they do not know 
hat the realization of that signal is identical for all traders. We 
efer to this signal as the common signal . The common signal is re- 
eased at the beginning of each trading period, and it is presented 
o traders with a value of 10 or 0 with precision P = 0 . 8 . The com-
on signal is equally informative about the dividend value for all 
raders, but the signal is no longer a predictor of the opinion of 
he other traders as the public signal is. 7 Thus far, the impact of 
 common signal on asset markets has not been analyzed in the 
heoretical and experimental literature. 
Comparing the PS80 and CS80 treatments allows to understand 
hether the commonality component of public information serves 
s the main driver of the overweighting, as suggested by the the- 
retical literature. In the PS80 and CS80 treatments, the first- 
rder beliefs are identical, whereas the second-order beliefs are 
arkedly different. To illustrate this important point, let us assume 
hat trader i observes a released signal whose value is 10. She in- 
ers that the expected value of the dividend conditional on the re- 
eased signal is 8 (first-order belief of trader i ). Moreover, in the 
S80 treatment, trader i knows that the first-order belief of each 
ne of the other traders is also 8 (second-order belief of trader 
 ). The common knowledge of the public signal allows trader i to 
nequivocally estimate the others’ beliefs. Conversely, in the CS80 
reatment, trader i does not know whether the other traders ob- 
erve a signal valued at 0 or 10. Therefore, to estimate the others’ 
eliefs, trader i has to take into account the probability distribu- 
ion of the realizations of the signal among other traders, creating 
 higher degree of uncertainty in the estimation of others’ beliefs. 
herefore, if traders base their trading strategies on their second- 
rder beliefs, we expect to observe that the overweighting effect in 
he CS80 treatment will exhibit a significantly different magnitude 
ompared to the PS80 treatment. 
.2. Experimental procedure 
The experiment was programmed using Z-Tree software 
 Fischbacher, 2007 ), and it was conducted at the Laboratori 
’Economia Experimental at University Jaume I in Castellón. A to- 
al of 118 undergraduate students in the Economics, Finance, and 
usiness Administration degree in at least their second year were 
ecruited. When subjects arrived at the laboratory, the instructions 
ere distributed and explained aloud using a PowerPoint presenta- 
ion. 8 This was followed by one practice period so that the subjects 
ecame familiar with the software and the trading mechanism. Af- 
er the instructions were explained and during the practice period, 7 When it is not necessary to specify whether the released signal is public or 
ommon signal, we refer to it as the released signal . 
8 Translated instructions are available in Appendix A.1 . 














































































































9 See Appendix B for the derivation of the fully revealing benchmark. Note that 
there is no released signal in the B treatment; thus, we pose S m = 0 . 
10 See Sunder (1995) , Plott (20 0 0) , and Noussair and Tucker (2013) for surveys of 
experimental asset markets. ubjects could privately ask questions about the experiment. Each 
ubject could participate in only one session, which consisted of 
0 markets. At the end of every market, dividends were paid out, 
nd the subjects’ profit was computed as the difference between 
he cash held at the end of the market and their initial cash en-
owment. Each subject’s final payout was computed as the accu- 
ulated profit in the 10 markets, and each subject was paid in 
ash at the end of the session. The average payout was about 20 €, 
nd each session lasted around 90 minutes. Note that the subjects 
ould incur losses. To avoid some of the problems associated with 
ubjects making real losses in experiments, we endowed all sub- 
ects with a participation fee of 3 €, which could be used to offset 
osses. No subject earned a negative final payout in any session. 
. Competing benchmarks 
We propose three competing benchmarks as possible explana- 
ions for the dynamics of prices in the asset market: i) the “no 
nformation acquisition - no trade equilibrium” as an equilibrium 
ased on the assumption of full rationality; ii) the fully revealing 
enchmark as a result of efficient aggregation of public and private 
nformation, inspired by the strong version of the efficient market 
ypothesis; and iii) the public information benchmark as an alter- 
ative explanation for the behavior of prices, implicitly assuming 
he existence and relevance of the overweighting effect. 
.1. No information acquisition - no trade equilibrium 
The experimental setting can be characterized by a “no infor- 
ation acquisition - no trade equilibrium” (hereafter “no-trade 
quilibrium”). If all traders are rational and risk neutral, or share 
he same beliefs and risk aversion, we should observe no transac- 
ion in the asset market and no information acquisition. The basic 
lement underlying this equilibrium lies in the constant-sum na- 
ure of the setting. Essentially, it means that a trader would have 
ncentives to acquire a private signal just in case she expects to re- 
over the acquisition cost, making profits at the expense of some 
ther traders. Thus, the other traders who have not acquired pri- 
ate signals would not trade with her. Therefore, the incentive for 
he first trader to acquire private information disappears, and there 
ill be no activity in the information and asset markets. As we see 
n Section 4 , this equilibrium is never achieved. Conversely, we al- 
ays observe a sustained level of trading activity and acquisition 
f information. 
.2. Fully revealing benchmark 
An alternative to the no-trade equilibrium is the fully revealing 
enchmark, defined as the expected price conditional on all infor- 
ation present in the market. Note that whereas no-trade equilib- 
ium is an equilibrium in the strict economic sense, the fully re- 
ealing benchmark is not. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show the 
mpossibility of the existence of equilibrium in a competitive mar- 
et with fully informative prices and contemporaneous access to 
ostly information. They resolve this paradox by introducing ex- 
genous noise to provide incentives for the acquisition of costly 
nformation. 
Addressing the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox experimentally, 
under (1992) finds that the fully revealing benchmark is a rea- 
onable predictor to describe price behavior in a laboratory asset 
arket. He suggests that the double auction mechanism creates 
nough endogenous noise to prevent an instantaneous revelation of 
nformation, creating incentives for traders to acquire information 
ven in the absence of exogenous noise. Therefore, we can rely on 
under’s conjecture to consider the fully revealing benchmark as 
 possible predictor of the level of prices. We compute the fully 4 evealing benchmark ( F R ) as the Bayesian conditional probability 
 P r(·|·) ) of D m = 10 , given all information available at time t in a
iven market m : 






)H mt (Q 
P 
)S m ]−1 
, (1)
here H mt refers to the net private signals available until time t , 
nd S m denotes the realization of the released signal. 
9 Employing 
q. (1) as a benchmark implies that the information is fully in- 
orporated into the price, independently of its nature (public or 
rivate). Moreover, each signal, including the released signal, has 
n impact on the market price proportional to its precision. Essen- 
ially, we rely on the efficient market hypothesis in its strong form 
 Fama, 1970 ). Thus, if the information present in the market is suf- 
cient to discover the dividend value, prices should converge to 
he dividend, independently of the realization of the public signal 
nd its precision. 
Nevertheless, many experimental contributions to laboratory fi- 
ancial markets find that information aggregation is imperfect, 
nd therefore, prices are just partial indicators of the fundamen- 
al value. 10 In particular, several experiments analyze information 
ggregation in Arrow-Debreu asset markets with acquisition of im- 
erfect information, finding limited evidence that prices efficiently 
ggregate all information. Considering this experimental literature, 
e expect to observe some deviations from the fully revealing 
enchmark. The main goal of our paper is to evaluate whether 
hose deviations systematically point to the public signal. 
.3. Public information benchmark 
We define that a public signal is overweighted when it ac- 
ounts for the market price more than justified by its precision. 
ontrary to the efficient market hypothesis, we conjecture that the 
fficiency of information aggregation depends on the nature of the 
nformation, namely, whether the incoming information is private 
r public. In this paper, we explicitly test whether public informa- 
ion is overweighted in the market price with respect to its preci- 
ion. 
Most laboratory contributions related to overweighting of pub- 
ic information are limited to stylized game theoretical coordi- 
ation models based on Morris and Shin (2002) ’ seminal paper. 
ornand and Heinemann (2014) and Shapiro et al. (2014) show 
hat the overweighting phenomenon can be observed, although it 
s milder than predicted by the theory. Note that, in this class 
f experiments, the overweighting effect is the strongest under 
ull rationality and weaker under bounded rationality. The lower- 
han-predicted overweighting of public information renders this 
ffect a second-order issue, at least in a coordination frame- 
ork ( Baeriswyl and Cornand, 2016 ). Ackert et al. (2004) and 
iddeldorp and Rosenkranz (2011) are the only contributions 
tudying the market overreaction to public disclosures in labora- 
ory financial markets. Recently, Page and Siemroth (2020) use a 
eta-analysis of experimental data to show that public informa- 
ion is almost completely incorporated into prices, while little pri- 
ate information is reflected in prices. Their finding is compatible 
ith the overweighting phenomenon, although they did not ex- 
licitly mention this effect in their paper. 
Our experimental setting exhibits the key elements suggested 
y the theoretical literature to observe overweighting of public in- 
ormation on market prices: (i) access to private and public infor- 
ation, (ii) heterogeneous expectations because of the endogenous 








































Average number of acquired signals at different time intervals (in 
seconds) by treatment. The number of acquired signals is averaged 
across markets. 
Seconds [0,10] (10,30] (30,60] (60,120] (120,180] 
B 22.9 3.0 3.1 3.3 1.6 
PS80 13.5 5.0 3.8 2.4 1.8 
PS70 10.9 3.2 1.7 1.3 1.0 

































cquisition of noisy private information, and (iii) the beauty con- 
est element following the Keynes’ metaphor in describing a finan- 
ial market (see Section 5 for an illustrative example). Consider- 
ng those three points, we rely on Allen et al. ’s (2006) ) result that
rices overweight public information if traders take into account 
he average belief of the other traders when deciding their trading 
trategy. 
To operatively detect the overweighting phenomenon, let us 
rst define the public information benchmark ( P B ) as the expected 
rice conditional only on public information: 






)V m ]−1 
, (2)
here V m = 0 in the B and CS80 treatments, whereas V m = S m in
he PS80 and PS70 treatments. We consider as a public signal the 
nnouncement, stated in the instructions, that the two states of 
he world are equally probable in the B and CS80 treatments. In 
hose treatments, P B m = 5 in all markets. Note that the fully re-
ealing benchmark of Eq. (1) and the public information bench- 
ark of Eq. (2) take into account the public signal. The main differ- 
nce is that the fully revealing benchmark based on the Bayesian 
ule weights all signals according to their respective precision, 
hereas the public information benchmark assigns a zero weight 
o private information. 
. Results 
Figs. C.8 through C.15, included in Appendix C, illustrate the 
rading activity in all markets for all treatments. A simple inspec- 
ion of market activity shows that the no-trade equilibrium is not a 
eaningful description of traders’ behavior in any treatment. This 
mpirical finding is in line with many experiments on laboratory 
nancial markets. Several recent papers examine under which con- 
itions subjects trade in the laboratory despite the theoretical in- 
entives not to do so ( Angrisani et al., 2008; Carrillo and Palfrey, 
011 ). A fraction of the trading activity in the market might be 
lso accounted for by the active participation hypothesis ( Lei et al., 
001 ), based on the lack of an alternative incentivized task for the 
ubjects rather than just participating in the asset market. 
.1. Information acquisition 
Fig. 1 displays the distribution of the number of acquired sig- 
als in the experiment. On average, almost 40% of traders acquire 





5 nother perspective, Table 2 shows that the acquisition of infor- 
ation monotonically decreases over time; most of the activity is 
oncentrated at the beginning of the market (the first 10 seconds). 
ote that the overall quantity of information is roughly invariant 
n the last trading minute. Therefore, we can consider the fully re- 
ealing benchmark approximately constant during that time inter- 
al. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the per-capita acquisition of signals per treat- 
ent. At first sight, the number of per-capita acquired signals is 
arger in the B treatment than in the other treatments. This sug- 
ests that the released signal crowds out the demand for private 
nformation. To formally analyze traders’ information acquisition 
hoices, we estimate a Poisson regression of the number of ac- 
uired signals ( AcqSign ) on the period of the session and treat- 
ent dummy variables ( PS80treat, PS70treat, CS80treat ), using the 
 treatment as the default condition. We run a Poisson regression 
ecause AcqSign is a count variable. We further evaluate whether 
he initial transactions affect the number of the acquired signals. 
ne can expect that initial transactions biased toward one of the 
ividend values might affect incentives to acquire information. We 
nclude the dummy variable AvgPrice15 or AvgPrice20 that takes a 
alue of 1 when the average price, computed within the first 15 
r 20 seconds, is lower than 3 or higher than 7. We compute the 
verage price within the first 15 or 20 seconds, because the trad- 
ng activity within the first 10 seconds is scarce or absent in some 
arkets. Results in Table 3 show that traders acquire significantly 
ewer private signals when a signal is released. Intuitively, releas- 
ng a signal helps investors forecast the fundamentals, reducing the 
arginal value of private information and therefore, crowding out 
ts demand. Performing a post-regression analysis, we find no sig- 
ificant differences among treatments where a signal is released 
Wald test, p = 0 . 36 and p = 0 . 32 comparing the PS80 and PS70
reatments, and the PS80 and CS80 treatments, respectively). The ig. 2. Per-capita demand for private information in each treatment. The figure dis- 
lays the distribution of the per-capita number of acquired signals at the market 
evel. 
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Table 3 
Poisson regression of the number of acquired signals ( AcqSign ). 
PS80treat, PS70treat , and CS80treat are dummy variables indicat- 
ing the treatment. The baseline is the B treatment. AvgPrice15 and 
AvgPrice20 are dummy variables, indicating that the average price 
in the first 15 or 20 seconds of the market is lower than 3 or 
higher than 7. One observation in the PS80 treatment is omitted, 
because one trader acquired a large number of signals in period 
10. The regressions also include the period of the session. Clus- 
tered standard errors on a subject level are given in parentheses. 
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) 
AcqSign AcqSign AcqSign 
PS80treat –0.44 ∗ –0.45 ∗ –0.44 ∗
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
PS70treat –0.69 ∗∗∗ –0.70 ∗∗∗ –0.69 ∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
CS80treat –0.70 ∗∗∗ –0.69 ∗∗∗ –0.68 ∗∗∗





Period –0.04 ∗∗∗ –0.04 ∗∗∗ –0.04 ∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 1.20 ∗∗∗ 1.11 ∗∗∗ 1.10 ∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
Observations 1,179 1,179 1,179 
Clusters 118 118 118 











































































11 The choice of averaging over the last trading minute is a compromise between 
having sufficient statistics for the market informativeness indicator and having low 
activity in the information market (see Table 2 ). In the last minute, either zero or 
a few signals are acquired, and therefore, the fully revealing benchmark is almost 
constant over time. Moreover, traders should have enough time to aggregate the 
information present in the market, giving the fully revealing benchmark its “best 
shot” as Plott and Sunder (1988) state. 
12 Except for market 9 of group 1 in the PS80 treatment, which is equal to 0.14. 
13 We define the price accuracy as the mean absolute distance between the price 
and the dividend across markets. Note that, considering Result 2 , price informative- 
ness and price accuracy are almost identical over the trading period. ariable period in a session has a negative effect on the number of 
cquired signals, suggesting some sort of learning effect of traders 
n better reading the price dynamics. Furthermore, we find that the 
umber of acquired signals is not significantly affected by the ini- 
ial transactions. 
esult 1. Releasing a free signal reduces incentives to acquire 
ostly signals, crowding out private information. 
The experimental literature on information acquisition in as- 
et markets is extensive. Related to the crowding-out, the few ex- 
erimental contributions in the literature consistently report a re- 
uction in acquisition of private information in the presence of 
ublic disclosures. Middeldorp and Rosenkranz (2011) are the first 
o find that releasing a public signal reduces the quantity of ac- 
uired information. Page and Siemroth (2017) recently examined 
ifferent aspects of information acquisition in a prediction market 
imilar to our setting. They report that traders acquire more in- 
ormation when their initial information is inconclusive, similarly 
o Ruiz-Buforn et al. (2021) , who additionally observe a crowding- 
ut effect when the public disclosures are conclusive. Implement- 
ng the information network in a laboratory prediction market, 
alim et al. (2019) find that social communication crowds out in- 
ormation production. 
.2. Market informativeness 
After having analyzed how a public disclosure affects the de- 
and for private information, we address whether the public sig- 
al compensates for the reduction in private information. To eval- 
ate the impact of public information on the potential to discover 
he true state of the world, we introduce the market informative- 
ess indicator. We define market informativeness as the mean ab- 
olute deviation (MAD) of the fully revealing benchmark about the 
ividend, averaged during the last minute of the market: 




| F R mt − D m | 
10 
. (3) 6 he label m indicates the given market. We divided by 10 to nor- 
alize all distances to be bounded between 0 and 1. The maxi- 
um level of market informativeness is reached when MI m = 0 . 
he higher the value of MI m , the lower the market informativeness. 
hus, a value of MI m close to zero indicates that the information 
resent in the market is sufficient to discover the dividend value. 11 
As one can infer from Figs. C.8 through C.15 , market informa- 
iveness always satisfies the condition MI m < 0 . 05 . 
12 This indicates 
hat the information present in the market is always sufficient to 
iscover the dividend value at a reasonable confidence level. De- 
pite the crowding-out effect on the demand for private informa- 
ion, the potential of the market to discover the true state of the 
orld is not affected by the released signal, independently of its 
ealization. Even in markets where disclosures are misleading, the 
verall private information is sufficient to discover the dividend 
alue. Therefore, the crowding-out effect is beneficial in reducing 
he overall cost of acquiring information, without affecting the po- 
ential of the market to discover the dividend value. 
esult 2. The crowding-out effect leaves invariant the potential of 
he market to discover the true state of the world, reducing the 
ost of acquisition of information. 
.3. Price informativeness 
We explore whether releasing a public signal affects the ag- 
regation of information into prices. We measure price informa- 
iveness by computing the mean absolute deviation of the market 
rice ( P R mt ) about the fully revealing benchmark, averaged among 
ll markets ( M = 20 ), for each treatment at a given time: 





| F R mt − P R mt | 
10 
. (4) 
The maximum level of price informativeness is given when 
AD F R t = 0 . Significant deviations from the lower bound indicate 
 low level of price informativeness. In Fig. 3 , the evolution of 
he price informativeness is plotted over time for each treatment. 
e observe a downsloping trend for all treatments, which sug- 
ests that prices tend to gradually aggregate information; conse- 
uently, the forecasting accuracy of the prices about the dividend 
mproves. 13 Given Result 2 , one would expect that the prices con- 
erge to the dividend in most of the markets, independently of the 
ealization of the released signal. Instead, none of the treatments 
hows full convergence of the prices to the dividends. 
esult 3. Prices imperfectly aggregate the information present in 
he market. 
This finding is in line with the behavior observed in previous 
ontributions on laboratory asset markets with endogenous costly 
rivate information (see, for example, Sunder, 1992; Corgnet et al., 
018 ). Nevertheless, differences among treatments are evident. Al- 
hough the prices in the B treatment quickly converge toward the 
ividend, eventually reaching 90% forecasting accuracy, treatments 
ith a public disclosure exhibit a smoother improvement in price 
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Beta regression of price informativeness ( MAD FR m ), considering all markets (1) 
and only markets with a correctly released signal (2). PS80treat, PS70treat , and 
CS80treat are dummy variables indicating the treatment. The baseline is the B 
treatment. The regressions also include the period of the session. Clustered stan- 
dard errors on the group level are given in parentheses. We have a total of eight 
clusters, given there are two independent groups per treatment. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ rep- 
resent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(1) (2) 
MAD FR m (All markets) MAD 
FR 
m (With correct signal) 
PS80treat 0.94 ∗∗∗ 0.80 ∗∗
(0.22) (0.40) 
PS70treat 0.29 ∗∗∗ –0.05 
(0.08) (0.13) 
CS80treat –0.67 ∗∗∗ –1.09 ∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.21) 
Period –0.10 ∗∗∗ –0.12 ∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) 
Constant –1.26 ∗∗∗ –1.46 ∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.21) 
Observations 80 66 
Clusters 8 8 



















nformativeness. Prices reach approximately 70% and 80% forecast- 
ng accuracy in the PS80 and PS70 treatments, respectively. Dif- 
erently, price informativeness exhibits similar values in the CS80 
nd B treatments. Fig. 3 suggests that public disclosures worsen 
he dissemination and aggregation of information, leading to a de- 
erioration in price informativeness compared to the B treatment. 
To formalize this finding, we estimate a Beta regression of the 
rice informativeness on the treatment dummy variables and the 
eriod of the session. We chose to employ a Beta regression be- 
ause the dependent variable takes values in the interval (0,1), and 
t is markedly skewed around its median. We compute the depen- 
ent variable as the mean absolute deviation of the prices from 
he fully revealing benchmark averaged in the last minute of each 
arket ( MAD F R m ), defined as: 





| F R mt − P R mt | 
10 
. (5) 
We find that the distance between the prices and the fully re- 
ealing benchmark significantly increases in the PS80 and PS70 
reatments. Conversely, in the CS80 treatment price informative- 
ess is significantly higher than in the B treatment. In the period, 
he deviations of the prices from the fully revealing benchmark are 
lso reduced. The results suggest that public disclosures deteriorate 
rice informativeness, while a common signal favors aggregation of 
nformation into prices. 
esult 4. Public disclosures worsen price informativeness. 
One might think that the reduction in price informativeness 
s exclusively due to the misleading public disclosures. However, 
hen we consider only the markets with a correct released sig- 
al in specification (2), price informativeness still exhibits a dete- 
ioration in the PS80 treatment and an improvement in the CS80 
reatment. Interestingly, the reduction in price informativeness is 
ccompanied by an increase in the level of trading activity. Public 
isclosures might distort prices, creating potential profit opportu- 
ities and consequently, increasing the trade volume (see Table D.7 
n Appendix D ). 
esult 5. Public disclosures increase trade volume. 
emark. One might wonder whether the deterioration in price in- 
ormativeness is exclusively caused by the crowding-out effect, as 
uggested by the literature. If this is the case, MAD F R m should be the 7 owest in the B treatment, and of similar magnitude in the PS80, 
S70, and CS80 treatments, as the number of acquired signals is 
ot statistically different (see Table 3 ). Instead, we find that price 
nformativeness worsens in the PS80 and PS70 treatments, while it 
mproves in the CS80 treatment, despite the crowding-out effect. 
ote further that the deterioration in price informativeness is sta- 
istically different in the PS80 with respect to the PS70, indicating 
 further deviation from the nexus crowding-out/price informative- 
ess (Wald test, p < 0 . 01 ). We provide evidence that the reduction
n price informativeness is not in a one-to-one relation with the 
rowding-out effect. The results imply that a larger number of ac- 
uired private signals is not per se a condition for increasing price 
nformativeness. More information does not always improve price 
nformativeness. 
esult 6. The crowding-out effect is not the main determinant of 
he deterioration in price informativeness. 
Contrary to the efficient market hypothesis, the results show 
hat the nature of the released signal, public or common, plays a 
rucial role in determining the efficiency of the market. 
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14 To evaluate the robustness of the results, we introduce an alternative bench- 
mark that replaces the public signal with the common signal in Eq. (2) . The strong 
reduction in the overweighting effect persists when we consider this new bench- 
mark (see Appendix E ). .4. Overweighting of public information 
Why does price informativeness improve when a common sig- 
al is released, although private information is crowded out? We 
how that prices systematically overweight public information, 
eading to a reduction in price informativeness. To detect whether 
ublic information is overweighted, we compare the goodness of 
t of the fully revealing benchmark and the public information 
enchmark in describing the behavior of prices. Let us introduce 
he mean absolute deviation of prices from PB, defined as: 





| P B m − P R mt | 
10 
. (6) 
hen MAD PB m is close to zero, prices fluctuate around the public in- 
ormation benchmark. Recall that the announcement of equiproba- 
le states of the world constitutes the public information in the B 
nd CS80 treatments, so that P B = 5 in those treatments. 
Using Eqs. (5) and (6) , we define the overweighting ratio as: 
m = M AD 
F R 
m − M AD PB m 
MAD F R,PB m 
, (7) 
here MAD F R,PB m = 1 60 
∑ 180 
t=120 
| F R mt −PB m | 
10 represents the mean abso- 
ute distance between the two benchmarks. The variable φ mea- 
ures the difference between the benchmarks’ goodness of fit in 
nits of their mutual distance; φ is bounded between -1 and 1. 
hen φ = 1 , the public benchmark perfectly accounts for prices. 
his case represents the extreme situation of complete overweight- 
ng of public information when, essentially, private information is 
otally disregarded in accounting for price behavior. Conversely, the 
ase φ = −1 indicates that prices converge to the fully revealing 
enchmark; that is, we have no overweighting effect. To interpret 
he overweighting ratio, we have to consider that the closer φ is 
o 1, the stronger the overweighting effect; that is, the higher the 
eight of the public signal with respect to private information in 
ccounting for price behavior. 8 Fig. 4 displays the distribution of φ in each treatment. At first 
lance, Fig. 4 shows that the distribution of the overweighting ra- 
io in the B treatment concentrates on values close to φ = −1 , 
hich means that the prices reflect (almost) all available infor- 
ation, weighted according to its precision. Instead, we observe 
 markedly different pattern in treatments with a released public 
ignal. The values of φ are scattered within the entire interval of 
ariability, with a positive bias in the PS80 treatment and a neg- 
tive bias in the PS70 treatment. This pattern suggests that pub- 
ic information is weighted more than is justified by its precision, 
ith a stronger effect in the PS80 treatment. When the signal is 
ommon instead of public, the distribution of φ is highly concen- 
rated at the value φ = −1 , similarly to the B treatment scenario. 
To formalize the visual impression, we estimate a Beta regres- 
ion of the overweighting ratio on the treatment dummies and the 
eriod. Specification (1) in Table 5 considers all markets, while 
pecification (2) considers only markets with a correct released 
ignal. We observe that the overweighting ratio significantly in- 
reases in the PS80 treatment in both specifications. This effect 
everses in the CS80 treatment, although it is significant only in 
pecification (2). 14 Considering the effect of releasing a public and 
ommon signal on price informativeness (see Table 4 ), we find that 
he price informativeness variations mirror the variations in the 
verweighting ratio across treatments. Putting it differently, a dete- 
ioration in price informativeness goes along with a stronger over- 
eighting effect. Furthermore, an improvement in price informa- 
iveness accompanies a reduction in the overweighting effect. In- 
tead of provoking a “generic” reduction in price informativeness, 
he release of a public signal yields systematic deviations of prices 
oward the public signal. 
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Table 5 
Beta regression of the overweighting ratio considering all markets (1) and only markets with a cor- 
rect released signal (2). To run the Beta regression, we transform the variable φ into a new variable 
bounded between 0 and 1, i.e. 1+ φ
2 
. PS80treat, PS70treat , and CS80treat are dummy variables indicating 
the treatment. The baseline is the B treatment. The regressions also include the period of the session. 
Clustered standard errors on the group level are given in parentheses. We have a total of eight clusters, 
given there are two independent groups per treatment. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(1) (2) 
φ-Overweighting (All markets) φ-Overweighting (With correct signal) 
PS80treat 1.34 ∗∗∗ 2.00 ∗∗
(0.43) (0.79) 
PS70treat 0.40 ∗∗∗ –0.11 
(0.15) (0.17) 
CS80treat –0.56 –1.24 ∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.17) 
Period –0.18 ∗∗∗ –0.19 ∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) 
Constant 0.40 0.29 
(0.35) (0.35) 
Observations 80 66 
Clusters 8 8 










































































esult 7. Prices overweight public disclosures, reducing price in- 
ormativeness. 
Looking again at Table 4 , releasing the common signal in the 
S80 treatment significantly improves price informativeness com- 
ared with the PS80 treatment (Wald test, p < . 01 ), and even com-
ared to the B treatment. The overweighting effect is strongly at- 
enuated in the CS80 treatment compared to the PS80 treatment, 
ecause the prices converge to the dividend in most markets. 
hen the commonality component is eliminated, the released sig- 
al does not constitute the main determinant of market prices. 
ontrary to the public signal, the common signal accumulates with 
he private information when aggregated into prices, without dis- 
orting the dissemination and the aggregation process. 
esult 8. The commonality component of the public signal causes 
he overweighting effect. 
.5. The role of the precision of the public signal 
Interpreting the relative precision of the public signal as its 
ransparency, we provide evidence in favor of the possibility that 
ontrolling the transparency of the released information allows to 
mooth the market overreaction to public disclosures. In specifica- 
ion (1) of Table 5 , releasing a public signal in the PS70 treatment
as a significant positive effect on the overweighting ratio; how- 
ver, this effect is significantly lower than in the PS80 treatment 
Wald test, p = . 03 ). Furthermore, such an effect is not significant
hen we consider only markets with a correct signal in the PS70 
reatment. This suggests that reducing the public signal’s precision 
oftens the overweighting effect as well as reduces the deteriora- 
ion in price informativeness. 
esult 9. The magnitude of the overweighting effect is influenced 
y the relative precision of the public signal with respect to a sin- 
le private signal. 
Concerning the optimal communication of monetary author- 
ties, several authors, such as Myatt and Wallace (2014) and 
aeriswyl and Cornand (2014) , propose to use the transparency of 
ublic information as a control variable when designing the central 
ank information disclosure policy. Result 9 supports the conjec- 
ure that setting the transparency of public disclosures constitutes 
n effective control instrument at the disposal of regulators. 9 .6. The role of second-order beliefs 
Although in the experiment we did not elicit subjects’ beliefs, 
e can indirectly infer their beliefs by analyzing the behavior of 
he market prices across the treatments. To do so, we focus on 
he finding that price informativeness is significantly higher in the 
S80 treatment than in the PS80 treatment. We argue that this dif- 
erence is due to the role that the commonality component of the 
ublic signal exerts on traders’ second-order beliefs. We start clas- 
ifying subjects’ beliefs following the “taxonomy” typically adopted 
n the k-level thinking framework ( Nagel, 1995; Camerer et al., 
004 ). 
Let us first assume that subjects’ trading strategies depend only 
n their first-order beliefs . When devising their trading strategy, 
ubjects consider irrelevant whether the released signal is pub- 
ic, common or iid because they only consider its expected value . 
herefore, we should not observe any significant difference be- 
ween PS80 and CS80 price informativeness. This argument sug- 
ests that a first-order belief bias (i.e., the subjects already over- 
eight the released signal in their first-order beliefs) does not de- 
ermine the overweighting effect. Although we cannot exclude its 
xistence, we do exclude that it is the primary cause of the reduc- 
ion in price informativeness. 
Let us alternatively assume that subjects’ trading behavior de- 
ends on their first- and second-order beliefs . We have to distin- 
uish whether subjects believe that the released signal in the CS80 
reatment is (i) iid or (ii) the same for all subjects. In the latter 
ase, we should not observe any difference between the CS80 and 
S80 treatments, because the subjects’ first- and second-order be- 
iefs are the same. 
Let us now assume that the subjects believe that the released 
ignal in the CS80 treatment is iid. As explained in Section 2 , the
iid) common signal creates a certain degree of uncertainty when 
he subjects form their second-order beliefs. Such uncertainty pre- 
ents the common signal from becoming a focal point for the sub- 
ects’ beliefs, favoring the dissemination and aggregation of infor- 
ation in the market. Conversely, the public signal ensures that all 
ubjects possess the same signal, allowing a more precise estima- 
ion of their second-order beliefs. The public signal, then, becomes 
 focal point for the alignment of the subjects’ beliefs, restrain- 
ng the information dissemination and its aggregation into prices 
see Section 5 ). Concluding our reasoning, our experimental results 
re compatible with the assumption of trading strategies based on 
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Table 6 
OLS regression of centered net profits by treatment. InfLevel1, InfLevel2 , and InfLevel3 
are dummy variables indicating that a trader has acquired one, two, or three or more 
signals. The baseline is a trader who has acquired no signals. Clustered standard errors 
on the subject level are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
NetProfit B NetProfit PS80 NetProfit PS70 NetProfit CS80 
InfLevel1 3.95 –11.15 ∗∗ –6.16 –11.64 
(5.62) (4.65) (4.69) (9.44) 
InfLevel2 6.99 5.07 6.37 ∗∗ 1.76 
(5.67) (8.69) (2.84) (4.77) 
InfLevel3 –7.05 ∗ –12.30 –1.88 –0.63 
(4.00) (9.45) (6.97) (5.32) 
Constant 43.77 ∗∗∗ 50.37 ∗∗∗ 46.87 ∗∗∗ 44.32 ∗∗∗
(3.20) (3.64) (2.01) (2.17) 
Observations 280 300 300 300 
Clusters 28 30 30 30 














































































econd-order beliefs and that the subjects consider the released 
ignal as iid in the CS80 treatment. 
The identified difference between the PS80 and CS80 treat- 
ents can be also cast into the framework of third-order beliefs: 
ubjects consider their own information together with the first- 
nd second-order beliefs of the other subjects. Within this frame- 
ork, we can devise more complex scenarios where the com- 
on or public nature of the released signal plays a role in the 
mplementation of the trading strategies. However, based on the 
iterature on k-level thinking, we can safely state that this sce- 
ario is highly improbable. This literature points out that first- 
nd second-order beliefs are the most frequent cognitive levels ob- 
erved in laboratory or field data ( Bosch-Domenech et al., 2002; 
agel, 2008 ). 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first contribution to 
he literature that observes and measures the overweighting ef- 
ect of public information in a market environment. Furthermore, 
e are the first to provide empirical evidence compatible with the 
onjecture that traders’ strategic pricing concerns trigger the over- 
eighting of public information beyond coordination experiments 
irectly reproducing the Morris and Shin (2002) framework. 
.7. Traders’ profits 
We analyze traders’ profit as a function of their information ac- 
uisition and the characteristics of the released signal. To that aim, 
e compute the net profit ( π ) of trader i in market m as: 
mi = (C 180 mi − C 0 ) + D m Assets 180 mi , (8) 
here (C 180 
mi 
− C 0 ) is the cash held at the end of the market af-
er paying back the initial endowment, and Assets 180 
mi 
denotes the 
umber of assets held at the end of the market. To compare the 
arkets with dividends 0 and 10, we redefine net profit by center- 
ng them; that is, ( πmi + 50 ) if D = 0 , and ( πmi − 50 ) if D = 10 . The
alue 50 is the expected value of the portfolio of the assets at the 
eginning of the market. 
We perform an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis 
or each treatment separately, clustering errors at the subject level. 
or explanatory variables, we define dummy variables according 
he number of signals acquired by traders: InfLevel1, InfLevel2, and 
nfLevel3 indicate that a trader acquires one signal, two, or three 
r more signals, respectively. InfLevel0 indicates that a trader does 
ot acquire a signal, uninformed trader. 
In Table 6 there are some differences across treatments. In the 
 treatment, traders with InfLevel1 and InfLevel2 and uninformed 
raders do not exhibit significantly different performances. Instead, 10 raders with InfLevel3 cannot recover the costs of acquiring infor- 
ation, performing significantly worse than uninformed traders. 
his pattern changes in markets with a released signal. A general 
endency across treatments seems to favor traders who acquire 
wo signals, while the decision to acquire one or three (or more) 
ignals does not outperform the choice of being uninformed. One 
an infer the following from Table 6 : 
esult 10. Releasing information at the beginning of the market 
hanges the pattern of the traders’ net profit, favoring the decision 
o acquire two signals. 
A general conclusion we can draw is that, intuitively, acquiring 
oo many signals has a negative impact on traders’ performance. 
owever, corroborating the released information by acquiring two 
ignals might help to outperform the market. The introduction of 
 released signal leads to a non-monotonic relationship between 
et profits and the number of acquired signals. Huber (2007) and 
uber et al. (2011) observe an analogous non-monotonic relation- 
hip between profits and information. 
. Bounded rationality, overweighting, and higher-order beliefs 
Following Allen et al. (2006) , public information may have an 
xcessive impact on prices when higher-order beliefs play a role in 
he determination of prices, because a public signal provides infor- 
ation about the dividend and information on the other traders’ 
eliefs. 
Let us introduce a qualitative idea on how traders could have 
he incentive to forecast other traders’ expectations in our finan- 
ial market. Inspired by the notion of prior-information traders in- 
roduced by Plott and Sunder (1988) , we assume that the market is 
opulated by bounded rational traders. An informed trader whose 
rivate signals suggest a dividend of 10 is willing to buy assets at 
ny price equal to or lower than her expected dividend. She ex- 
ects to make a profit by buying the asset at a low price. In par-
icular, if this trader believes that there is a non-marginal fraction 
f uninformed traders (i.e., a trader who does not acquire a sig- 
al), she has an incentive to bid around her belief of uninformed 
raders’ expected dividend, that is, the public information bench- 
ark. Uninformed traders could be willing to buy and sell their 
ssets around their expected dividend, determined solely by the 
ublic signal. 
When the proportion of uninformed traders willing to trade 
ith informed traders is high enough to provide sufficient liquid- 
ty and/or assets, market prices fluctuate around the expected div- 
dend conditional on the public signal. Therefore, prices do not re- 




























































































































ect traders’ private information. Prices reflect mostly the expec- 
ations for and about uninformed traders’ beliefs, which are bi- 
sed toward public information. In this case, the public information 
enchmark better predicts the market price than the fully reveal- 
ng benchmark does. 
What we have just sketched could be a simple mechanism be- 
ind the overweighting of public information, based on the impact 
f public information on traders’ second-order beliefs. Further re- 
earch is necessary to experimentally investigate the microstruc- 
ure details of this process and account for the results we iden- 
ified in our experiment. Specifically, ongoing research is explor- 
ng the behavior of traders in an environment with exogenous al- 
ocation of information. Although losing some degree of realism, 
his simplification of the experimental setting allows for a detailed 
nalysis of traders’ trading behavior as a function of the level of 
nformation, which is invariant over time. 
The previous reasoning essentially rests on traders’ bounded ra- 
ionality. In contrast, the literature has introduced the overweight- 
ng effect as an equilibrium outcome of coordination models with 
ully rational agents, as in Morris and Shin (2002) . Cornand and 
einemann (2014) and Shapiro et al. (2014) provide two contri- 
utions that analyze the impact of different degrees of rational- 
ty on the overweighting phenomenon within the boundedly ratio- 
al behavioral framework introduced by Nagel (1995) . They show 
hat the higher the level of bounded rationality, which is mea- 
ured as the degree of inductive reasoning, the lower the over- 
eighting phenomenon. Note, however, that we observe the op- 
osite relationship between the level of rationality and the over- 
eighting of public information. In our setting, full rationality im- 
lies either a no-trade equilibrium or a noisy rational expectation 
quilibrium, following Sunder ’s (1992) ) argument. In both cases, 
e should not observe the overweighting effect, because we have 
ither no trade or the price reflects the information according to 
ts precision. Therefore, the bounded rationality of traders seems 
o be a necessary condition to detect the overweighting of pub- 
ic information in our market environment. As we do not explicitly 
ntroduce a coordination setting, the experimental results general- 
ze existing literature, showing that the overweighting effect is a 
elevant phenomenon in a market setting with bounded rational 
raders rather than being a marginal effect observed in coordina- 
ion environments. 
In the literature, several elegant frameworks account for devi- 
tions from full rationality, such as Camerer et al. ’s (2004) ) cog- 
itive hierarchy model or Eyster and Rabin ’s (2005) ) cursed equi- 
ibrium. In particular, Eyster et al. (2019) apply the cursed equi- 
ibrium to a financial market, showing that public information is 
verweighted when aggregated into market prices. Similar to that 
heoretical contribution, our paper provides experimental support 
or the overweighting effect within the framework of bounded ra- 
ionality. 
We can find other important contributions in modeling 
ounded rationality in the literature on noise traders. A corner- 
tone is De Long et al. ’s (1990) ) paper on noise trading. They the-
retically show that the interaction between informed traders (ar- 
itrageurs) with a limited trading horizon and noise traders could 
ive rise to an equilibrium price that deviates from the fundamen- 
als. To obtain such a result, they exogenously imposed a correla- 
ion among noise traders, justified by the presence of an optimistic 
arket mood or market sentiment . In De Long et al. ’s (1990) ) orig-
nal paper, this correlation is introduced assuming that the rep- 
esentative noise trader’s misperception is a normal random vari- 
ble with mean ρ∗. Without being too rigorous and based on 
ur experimental results, the existence of such a systemic corre- 
ation can be alternatively related to the presence of public infor- 
ation, systematically influencing the formation of noise traders’ 
eliefs. 11 . Conclusions 
The main purpose of this paper is to experimentally examine 
he aggregation of information in financial markets as a function 
f traders’ access to different sources of information, namely, cost- 
ess public and costly private information. Such an informational 
etting has been used extensively in the literature to model the 
ntervention of regulatory authorities. The objective of regulatory 
nstitutions when releasing public information is essentially to dis- 
ipline the market, reducing the potential negative effects of asym- 
etric information. According to the theoretical literature, how- 
ver, the release of public information might have adverse effects, 
uch as the overweighting of public information and the crowding 
ut of private information. 
We show that overweighting of public information on market 
rices exists, and it is measurable and empirically relevant, heav- 
ly affecting market performance. Moreover, in this experimental 
etting, this effect emerges without an explicit incentive for the 
ubjects to coordinate, as in other experimental studies reproduc- 
ng the very specific Morris and Shin (2002) theoretical framework. 
e illustrate that traders’ overreaction to public information is a 
ore general phenomenon than conjectured by the literature. By 
nvestigating the dual role of public information, we find that the 
ommonality component is mainly responsible for the overweight- 
ng phenomenon. Introducing public information negatively affects 
he aggregation of information into prices, as prices are biased to- 
ard the public signal. Conversely, providing a common signal to 
ll traders improves the aggregation of information. 
Some general warnings for regulators can be derived from this 
et of experiments. Policymakers should be aware that the release 
f public information might have distorting effects on traders’ ef- 
ort to find alternative sources of information and on the aggrega- 
ion of information into prices. Such effects might be extremely 
ignificant, as demonstrated by the role that credit rating agen- 
ies had in the spread of the 2008 financial crisis. Far from op- 
osing the activity of public institutions in releasing information 
o discipline financial markets, we stress the unintended effects of 
he complex interaction between private and public information on 
arket performance. 
As policy advice, we recommend that ongoing reforms of the 
egulation of financial institutions (for instance, credit rating agen- 
ies) should account for the complex interplay, that we identi- 
ed in the experiments. In particular, the reforms should provide 
ncentives for investors (institutional and/or private) to actively 
earch for alternative sources of information. To take stock of the 
egulatory advantages of releasing public information and smooth- 
ng its potential adverse effects, we provide some guidelines for 
esigning public communication and disclosure strategies: (i) More 
recise public information does not necessarily help the market 
lign with the fundamentals, as public information does not cumu- 
ate; but it substitutes private information because of crowding-out 
nd overweighting effects. (ii) It is not always optimal to reveal all 
he information possessed by public institutions. In this respect, it 
ight be more effective to release an informative signal that is not 
erceived as too precise by investors to avoid market overreaction. 
he level of transparency of public information should be tuned 
onsidering the precision of the private information at the disposal 
f traders. Therefore, it is advisable to use econometric techniques 
or developing some proxies for the precision of traders’ private in- 
ormation, based, for instance, on survey data. Interestingly, if we 
nterpret the common information setting as a disclosure strategy, 
he most effective measure we have identified to enhance mar- 
et efficiency and at the same time, reduce the cost of gather- 
ng private information, is whispering in the ears of investors, that 
s, spreading common information among investors without being 
ommon knowledge. However, we understand that it is unrealis- 













































































15 We explained to the subjects that private signals are independent, which means 
that each acquired private signal is a new draw. Therefore, they may observe differ- 
ent signals. 
16 The values of the different probabilities are changed in accordance to the dif- 
ferent treatments. ic to expect this measure could be implemented in real financial 
arkets. 
Finally, we strongly believe that the laboratory setting can be 
sed as a realistic testbed for evaluating the performance of dif- 
erent policy instruments, without relying on specific behavioral 
ssumptions and/or ad hoc coordination mechanisms. As a result, 
ur conclusions can be more robust than those based on experi- 
ental settings currently used. Several other measures can also be 
ested, such as sequentially releasing public information, reducing 
he level of publicity, or increasing the number of regulatory in- 
titutions ( Ruiz-Buforn et al., 2021 ). Examining the effects of these 
easures is the focus of ongoing research. 
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ppendix A. Material of the experiment 
English translation of instructions as well as English translation 
f the computer screens as seen by the subjects in each treatment. 
1. Instructions of the experiment 
Welcome. This is an economic experiment on decision making 
n financial markets. The instructions are simple and if you care- 
ully follow them, you can earn a considerable amount of money. 
our earnings will be personally communicated to you and paid in 
ash at the end of the experiment. 
During the experiment your gains will be measured in exper- 
mental units (ECU) that will be translated into Euro at the end 
f the experiment using an exchange rate of 1 € for every 50 ECU 
ccumulated, plus a fixed amount for participating 3 €. The corre- 
ponding amount in € will be paid in cash at the end of the exper- 
ment. 
At the beginning of the experiment, it has been assigned a 
umber to each one of you. From now on, that number will iden- 
ify you and the rest of the participants. Communication is not al- 
owed among the participants during the session. Any participant 
ho does not comply will be expelled without payment. 
THE MARKET 
You are in a market together with 14 other participants. 12 At the beginning of each period, your initial portfolio consists 
f 10 assets and 10 0 0 ECU as cash. Each participant has the same
nitial portfolio. 
The experiment consists of 10 periods of 3 minutes each. In 
ach period, you and the other participants will have the oppor- 
unity to buy and sell assets. You can buy and sell as many assets 
s you want, although each bid or ask involves the exchange of a 
ingle asset. Therefore, the assets are bought and/or sold one at a 
ime. 
INFORMATION AND DIVIDENDS 
At the end of each period, you will receive a specific dividend 
or the assets you hold in your portfolio. The value of the divi- 
end can be 0 or 10 with the same probability. 
Thus, without additional information, the value of the assets 
an be 0 or 10 with a probability of 50%. 
Moreover, you can acquire a private signal on the value of the 
ividend at the end of the period. The signal you will receive will 
e 0 or 10: 15 
• A private signal equal to 0 means that with a probability of 
80% the value of the dividend will be 0 at the end of the pe-
riod. 16 
• A private signal equal to 10 means that with a probability of 
80% the value of the dividend will be 10 at the end of the pe-
riod. 
he cost of the signal is 4 ECU . During each period, you can buy
s many signals as you wish. This will be your private information 
nd therefore you will be the only one able to see it. 
[ Only in the public information treatments: ] In addition, you will 
ave a public signal that will be correct with a probability of 80%, 
hat is: 
• A public signal equal to 0 means that with a probability of 80% 
the value of the dividend will be 0 at the end of the period. 
• A public signal equal to 10 means that with a probability of 
80% the value of the dividend will be 10 at the end of the pe-
riod. 
[ Only in the common information treatments: ] In addition, you 
ill have a free signal that will be correct with a probability of 
0%, that is: 
• A signal equal to 0 means that with a probability of 80% the 
value of the dividend will be 0 at the end of the period. 
• A signal equal to 10 means that with a probability of 80% the 
value of the dividend will be 10 at the end of the period. 
t the end of each period, your profit will be the cash you have at
he end of the period plus the dividends for the assets you own, 
inus the cash you had at the beginning of the period, that is, 
0 0 0 ECU. 
Your payment at the end of the session corresponds to the ac- 
umulated profit during the 10 periods. 
If at any time you have any questions or problems, do not hes- 
tate to contact the experimenter. Remember that it is important 
hat you understand correctly the operation of the market, since 
our earnings depend both on your decisions and on the decisions 
f the other participants in the market. 
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A
ot of the B treatment. 
he PS80 and PS70 treatments. 2. Screenshots 
Fig. A.5. Screensh
Fig. A.6. Screenshot of t13 
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ppendix B. Fully revealing benchmark 
Let us compute the fully revealing benchmark in our setting. 
sing Bayesian inference, we compute the probability that the div- 
dend is equal to 10 ECU conditioned on the series of signals ac- 
uired by subjects until time t . We refer to I t as the market pri-
ate information set I t = { s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s j . . . , s t } . s t takes a value of -1
hen the private signal indicates that the dividend is 0. Conversely, 
 t takes a value of 1 when the private signal suggests that the div- 
dend is 10. Additionally, we introduce the variable S ∈ {−1 , 1 } in
he PS70, PS80, and CS80 treatments. Following the previous rea- 
oning, S = −1 when the public or common signal predicts a div- 
dend 0 and S = 1 otherwise. P r(D = 10 | I t , S) denotes the proba-
ility of observing a dividend equal to 10 ECU conditioned on the 
nformation available at time t: 17 
 r(D = 10 | I t , S) = P r(I t | D = 10) · P r(D = 10 | S) 
P r(I t , S) 
, (B.1) 
here P r(I t , S) is the marginal probability computed as 
 r(I t , S) = P r(I t | D = 10) · P r(D = 10 | S) + P r(I t | D = 0) · P r(D = 0 | S) . 
(B.2) 
 r(D = 10 | S) is the prior probability of the event D = 10 , given the
ublic signal S. P r(D = 0 | S) indicates the prior probability of the
vent D = 0 . The values of this conditional probability are defined 
ater on. 
Let us now compute the formula of Eq. (B.1) as a function of 
• p, the probability that a single private signal is correct, with 
q = 1 − p; 
• P, the probability that the public or common signal is correct, 
with Q = 1 − P ; 
• N t , the number of signals in the information set available until 
time t and 
• n t , the number of 1s, and N t − n t , the number of -1s in I t . 
In the following, when not necessary, we will omit the time 
ariable t from the variables n t and N t . Depending on the value of 17 Mutatis mutandis , the probability of observing a dividend equal to 0 ECU is 




14 , the numerator of Eq. (B.1) is given by: 
P r(I t | D = 10) · P r(D = 10 | S = 1) = p n · q N−n · P , 
 r(I t | D = 10) · P r(D = 10 | S = −1) = p n · q N−n · Q , and (B.3) 
P r(I t | D = 10) · P r(D = 10 | S = 0) = p n · q N−n · 1 
2 
. 
The marginal probability in Eq. (B.2) takes the following form: 
P r(I t , S = 1) = P · p n · q N−n + Q · p N−n · q n , 
 r(I t , S = −1) = Q · p n · q N−n + P · p N−n · q n , (B.4) 
P r(I t , S = 0) = 1 
2 
p n · q N−n + 1 
2 
p N−n · q n . 
Combining Eqs. (B.1) , (B.2), (B.3) , and (B.4) and defining H t = 
 t 
j=1 s j = 2 n t − N t as the aggregate net private signal available at 
ime t , we obtain the probability that the dividend is equal to 10 
s a function of the relevant information present in the market at 
ime t: 










Finally, using Eq. (B.5) , the fully revealing benchmark for the 
sset price under risk neutrality assumption is given by: 











ppendix C. Trading activity 
Every panel plots the chart of transactions. The vertical axis 
hows the price at which the transaction took place, and the hor- 
zontal axis shows the time (in seconds) at which the transaction 
ook place. The first number at the caption of each panel identifies 
he market, and the second one indicates the value of the divi- 
end (either 10 or 0). The solid line is the trading price. Finally, 
he dotted line indicates the fully revealing benchmark, whereas 
he dashed line, if present, indicates the public information bench- 
ark. 
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Fig. C.8. Transactions overtime and fully revealing benchmark in each market of the B treatment (Group 1). Fig. C.9. Transactions overtime and fully revealing bench
15 mark in each market of the B treatment (Group 2). 
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Fig. C.10. Transactions overtime, fully revealing benchmark, and public benchmark in each market of the PS80 treatment (Group 1). 
Fig. C.11. Transactions overtime, fully revealing benchmark, and public benchmark in each market of the PS80 treatment (Group 2). 
16 
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Fig. C.12. Transactions overtime, fully revealing benchmark, and public benchmark in each market of the PS70 treatment (Group 1). 
Fig. C.13. Transactions overtime, fully revealing benchmark, and public benchmark in each market of the PS70 treatment (Group 2). 
17 
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Fig. C.14. Transactions overtime, fully revealing benchmark, and public benchmark in each market of the CS80 treatment (Group 1). 
Fig. C.15. Transactions overtime, fully revealing benchmark, and public benchmark in each market of the CS80 treatment (Group 2). 
18 
































Beta regression of overweighting ratio given the released signal, consid- 
ering all markets (1) and only markets with a correct released signal 
(2). To run the Beta regression, we transform the variable ψ into a new 
variable bounded between 0 and 1, i.e. 1+ ψ 
2 
. PS80treat, PS70treat , and 
CS80treat are dummy variables indicating the treatment. The baseline 
is the B treatment. The regressions also include the period of the ses- 
sion. Clustered standard errors on the group level are given in parenthe- 
ses. We have a total of eight clusters, given there are two independent 
groups per treatment. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
(1) (2) 
ψ-Overweighting ψ-Overweighting 
(All markets) (With correct signal) 
PS80treat 1.55 ∗∗∗ 1.97 ∗∗
(0.48) (0.77) 
PS70treat 0.46 ∗∗∗ –0.10 
(0.18) (0.17) 
CS80treat –0.77 ∗∗∗ –1.06 ∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.19) 
Period –0.18 ∗∗∗ –0.19 ∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) 
Constant 0.35 0.29 
(0.34) (0.35) 
Observations 80 66 
Clusters 8 8 























C  ppendix D. Trade volume 
Table D.7 illustrates the results of an OLS regression analysis 
f market trade volume (measured as number of transaction per 
arkets) on the treatment dummies, period and price informative- 
ess ( MAD F R m ). Specification (1) suggests that public disclosures af- 
ect positively trade volume, while the common signal does not 
ave a significant effect. When we include MAD F R m as an additional 
egressor, we observe a positive and significant effect on trade vol- 
me, while the treatment dummies turn out to be not significant. 
e can infer that the trade volume is mainly related to the effi- 
iency of prices in reflecting the available information. Our analysis 
uggests that, when the aggregation of information is poorer, there 
re more profits opportunities and more transactions. A higher de- 
ree of price informativeness generates less profit opportunity and, 
herefore, less trade volume. 
Table D.7 
OLS regression of trade volume. PS80treat, PS70treat 
and CS80treat are dummy variables indicating the 
treatment. The baseline is the B treatment. MAD FR m , 
which is defined in Eq. (5) , stands for mean absolute 
deviation of prices from the fully revealing bench- 
mark in the last minute of the market. The regres- 
sions also include the period of the session. Clus- 
tered standard errors on a group level are given in 
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(1) (2) 
Trade Volume Trade Volume 
PS80treat 25.75 ∗ 17.93 
(11.80) (9.61) 
PS70treat 7.45 ∗∗ 4.89 
(2.67) (2.65) 
CS80treat 7.10 6.92 
(4.71) (6.00) 
Period 0.87 1.69 ∗
(0.81) (0.84) 
MAD FR m 42.97 
∗∗∗
(10.82) 
Constant 62.47 ∗∗∗ 53.37 ∗∗∗
(4.60) (5.76) 
Observations 80 80 
Clusters 8 8 
R-squared 0.19 0.33 
ppendix E. Alternative Benchmark 
We further analyze the overweighting effect by redefining the 
verweighting ratio computed in Eq. (7) . Instead of using the mean 
bsolute distance between prices and public benchmark, we con- 
ider the mean absolute distance between prices and the common 
ignal. We want to find out whether the common signal constitutes 
 focal point, similarly to the public signal. This change only affects 
he CS80 treatment, where PB = 5 is replaced in Eq. (2) by the val-
es 2 or 8 depending on the realization of the common signal. We 
abel the new overweighting ratio as ψ . 
We reproduce the analysis of Table 5 with the redefined over- 
eighting ratio ψ . Table D6 displays consistent results compared 
o Table 5 . In particular, we find that the ψ overweighting ratio 
n the CS80 treatment is always significantly lower than in the B 
reatment. With this complementary analysis, we demonstrate that 
he observed differences between the PS80 and CS80 treatments 
re robust to changes in the reference level when computing the 
ublic/common benchmark. 19 eferences 
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